The Fourth Generation of the PUK

Karwan Anwar

Written by Karwan Anwar

First Generation – the founders and pioneers of the idea behind the establishment of the PUK. This generation consisted of numerous comrades, intellectuals, political figures, and advocates of leftist, liberal, and Kurdish thought, both within and outside Kurdistan. They included the heroes of the early detachments and organisations, as well as the martyrs who chose to “live briefly, but with dignity”, alongside those who endured imprisonment and faced execution with courage.

Second Generation – the generation that carried forward the ideals and armed struggle of the PUK and Kurdish identity. They included organisational members, prisoners, Peshmerga fighters, battlefield martyrs, couriers, Kolbars, smugglers of weapons, food and equipment, village councils, and the many social groups and young people who guided the PUK through difficult times towards the 1991 uprising and the Spring period.

Third Generation – this generation came of age in the post-uprising era. Many of them went on to manage smaller sectors and subsidiary institutions within the PUK, including women’s organisations, student bodies, journalism, the Peshmerga, party structures, and administrative institutions.

At the time of the First Congress, many members of the third generation were still politically inexperienced young people and were therefore not granted the right to participate. During the Second Congress, only a limited number were able to take part. By the Third Congress in 2010, dozens of comrades from this generation were given the opportunity to participate. Several also stood for leadership positions, although unfortunately none were successful.

Since then, however, the third generation has come to occupy the majority of government, party, and administrative positions. They are now responsible for managing most party sectors, and some have attained senior positions within the leadership and Political Bureau. It can be said that the third generation is now effectively leading the PUK.

The third generation may also be described as a “generation of waiting”, because between 2010 and 2019 the party lost the opportunity to hold three congresses within its organisational schedule. As a result, this generation remained in a prolonged period of waiting, deprived for three terms of the opportunity to advance into the leadership and Political Bureau.

Nevertheless, during both the Fourth and Fifth Congresses, the third generation regained momentum within the PUK, making up for a decade in which no congresses, conferences, or plenary sessions had been held to legitimise and demonstrate their political role. Aside from a small number of young members who remained active within the Central Council, youth participation during those ten years was extremely limited.

As a consequence of these circumstances, men and women from this generation formed the majority of delegates at the Fourth Congress. It was noticeable that a large number of these young members put themselves forward for leadership positions.

Every comrade who fulfils the nomination requirements has the legitimate right to stand for office. However, could an entire generation realistically nominate itself at a single congress?

In every electoral process, voters and candidates represent two interconnected sides of the same equation. Each side derives legitimacy and weight from the other, and together they complete the democratic process, as has been evident throughout the history of elections worldwide.

For this reason, the number of voters and candidates at the Fourth Congress created an imbalance, and the process was not conducted in a manner consistent with the proper rhythm of electoral calculations. To prevent such situations from recurring, it became necessary to introduce new electoral principles and mechanisms capable of safeguarding both sides of the equation and, in turn, protecting the integrity of the entire voting process.

Accordingly, the Fifth Congress, held from 27 September to 1 October 2023, was organised ahead of schedule and introduced a new nomination mechanism for comrades, which was approved during the congress. The aim was to protect every comrade’s right to stand for election, while at the same time ensuring that the overall voting process was conducted within a legal framework and according to internationally recognised standards under the supervision of the electoral body.

It was at the Fifth Congress that the third generation consolidated its political and organisational standing and paved the way for what I would call the fourth generation.

Fourth Generation – I do not believe this generation fears that the PUK will fail to hold its Sixth Congress within the next nine or ten years. This confidence allows the fourth generation to aspire to leadership, party, and administrative positions. For every comrade, it is natural to fear not winning elections; however, the concerns of this generation will differ from those of previous generations, focusing less on grievances about the party and its programme and more on shaping its future direction.

It is natural for a new generation — the fourth generation of the PUK — to emerge onto the political scene and regard the third generation as traditional or “classic”, just as similar tensions once existed between the second and third generations.

In speaking about the fourth generation, I would say that this generation differs significantly from the previous three generations of the PUK. They are young, highly intelligent, multilingual, and deeply engaged with the digital world. Their understanding of global political theories and contemporary political thought is clear and well developed.

They are knowledgeable about environmental protection, women’s freedoms, human rights, media freedom, the right to protest, and international laws and regulations.

However, the principal weakness of the fourth generation of the PUK is its limited connection to history. In many ways, they are the generation of the present moment, shaped primarily by the realities of the era in which they live.

They are a generation of negotiation, discourse, and in-depth political analysis. They are capable of shaping major debates and influencing the direction of contemporary events.

At the same time, they place less faith in the use of force, rapid mobilisation, or armed struggle. Yet one must ask: what would happen if an emergency situation similar to that of 2014 were to arise again? Had it not been for the party, its members, and the Peshmerga, the lives and security of our people would have been placed in grave danger.

Despite both the criticisms and praise directed towards the fourth generation, the realities of the party’s current stage make it essential for the third generation not to obstruct this emerging generation, but instead to support and facilitate its rise to senior political, organisational, and diplomatic positions.