Munich as a Geopolitical Threshold: Macron and Abdi in the Engineering of “Deferred Stability”

Abbas Abdul Razzaq

Written by Abbas Abdul Razzaq, retired university professor and a veteran journalist.
Translated by Sharo Abbas

When French President Emmanuel Macron met with Mazloum Abdi, commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference, the event was more than a mere meeting between two parties over a complex regional file. It was a concentrated moment revealing a shift in European policy: a transition from the logic of "intervening to change reality" to the logic of "managing reality as it is."

In this shift lies the philosophical dimension of the meeting. Europe is no longer asking how to end the Syrian war, but rather how to prevent its return to the point of explosion.

From Sovereignty to Security Governance

In classical state theory, foreign policy is built upon the concept of sovereignty. However, in the contemporary model adopted by Europe, the centre of gravity has shifted from sovereignty to "security governance."

The question is no longer: Who rules the land? Instead, it is: Who prevents chaos on this land?

In this sense, the SDF is transformed from a local actor into a component of a trans-border security system. The partnership with them is not so much a political recognition as it is a functional arrangement within a broader security network aimed at containing risks rather than producing solutions. This is the policy of "minimal stability"—the bare minimum required to prevent collapse without establishing a new order.

Syria as a Laboratory for "Slow Geopolitical Time"

Syria today reveals a phenomenon that can be described as "slow geopolitical time." There are no major wars, no final settlements, but rather the continuous management of a protracted crisis.

In this era, the meeting between Macron and Abdi becomes an act within a strategy to maintain a fragile equilibrium. Paris realises that any sudden withdrawal would redistribute power in favor of other players: Moscow, Tehran, or Ankara. Here, politics is not a search for victory, but an avoidance of loss.

The Turkish Paradox: Coexisting with Contradiction

This meeting presents Europe with a complex paradox: Türkiye is a NATO ally, and the SDF is a security partner. The critical European school of thought does not view this contradiction as an error, but as an expression of the nature of modern politics, which is based on "managing plurality" rather than "resolving conflict."

Balance does not mean harmony; it means the ability to coexist with irresolvable tensions. Here, Paris's pragmatism is evident: a discourse that affirms Syrian territorial integrity while simultaneously maintaining a functional relationship with a local, quasi-independent force.

Beyond Hard Power

France is no longer a decisive power on the Syrian battlefield, yet it has not exited the equation. This pattern of presence can be described as "symbolic-political power"—a presence aimed at preventing the marginalisation of the European role in any future reconfiguration. The meeting, therefore, is not a military act but a declaration of endurance. In international politics, staying power is itself a form of strength.

Stability as a Moral Value or a Control Mechanism?

This moment poses a deeper question: Is Europe seeking a just stability or a manageable stability?

The difference is fundamental. The former assumes a comprehensive political settlement that redistributes power. The latter is content with freezing the conflict and preventing its eruption. The Munich meeting suggests that the European choice leans toward the latter. It is a functional stability, not a historical transformation.

Geography That Does Not Conclude

Syria today is not just a battlefield; it is a geographic knot where divergent regional projects intersect. In such knots, "grand strategies" rarely succeed as well as policies of "cold incrementalism."

Through this meeting, Paris practices this incrementalism: it maintains the thread of the relationship, preserves its partner, and waits for a moment of regional maturity that may not arrive soon.

The Engineering of Deferral

The Macron-Abdi meeting can be read as part of a broader framework that might be called "the engineering of deferral"—deferring collapse, deferring resolution, and deferring the redrawing of the map. It is a policy that does not promise salvation, but promises not to fall. It does not build a new system, but prevents the collapse of the existing one.

Herein lies the irony: in a world where grand projects are in retreat, maintaining the "possible" becomes an achievement in itself. Yet, the question that remains hanging over both Munich and Syria is: How long can crisis management substitute for a crisis solution? Will "deferred stability" one day turn into a foundational stability, or will it remain merely a long truce in an open-ended history?